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FINAL

EXI0~NATI ON

Administrative Law and Procedure (L3l)
Fall
NOTE:

S~~ester

1972

Lim! t anS\'lers to three (3) single sn ace exam book pages.

QUESTION 1:
The National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) has
and maintaining environmental quality.

t~e

broad goal of restoring

The heart of the statute and the section

\-7hich has been the source of almost all NEPA litigation is Section 102 which requires
that "all agencies of the Federal Government shall . • • include in every recommendation or report on •

major Federal actions significantly affecting the quality

of the human environment, a detailed statement by the resnonsible official . . • f! on
the environmental impact of the proposed action.
In the landmark NEPA case, Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating

Co~ission

v. ArC,

449 F.2d 1109 (D.C. Cir. 1971, the Circuit Court of f,pneals for the District of
Columbia Circuit found that t!"le II..EC had breached a judicially enforcearle duty in
that, Hhile the AEC regulations did require that a detailed environmental statement
be prepared prior to the hearing conducted by the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board
in its review of the proposed project, the regulations did not require the board
to consider the detailed statement at the hearing.

Instead the

Co~mission

believed

that it could carry out its t\TEPA responsibilities entirely outside the hearing
process.

The court stated that the Commission's "crabbed interpretation!' of NEPA

made "a mockery of the Act."

If the detailed statement Here to serve any purpose,

hearing boards could not he left free to ignore the contents of the statement and
still satisfy the !lcongressional intent that environnental factors, as cOIDniled in
the 'detailed statement' be considered through agency review processes."

Thus,

the Calvert Cliffs' holding (that a detailed statement must be submitted prior
to any agency formal hearing on a proposed federal action that affects the environment.) meant the NEPA statement must be included in the formal hearing issues .
Having so ruled the Court remanded the record to A.E.C. for hearings and decision
on the N.E.P.A. statement and issues.
In that posture of the matter one of the parties to the proceeding (Coalition
for Safe Nuclear POvler and Living :" In A Finer Environment) filed a motion with
A.E.C. requesting that A.E.C. suspend the license previously issued to the
Baltimore Gas & Electric Co authorizing commencement of construction of the
Calvert Cliffs nuclear electric generating plant.

No hearing was requested.
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A.E.C. denied the motion and declined to issue an order suspending the construction permit pending the hearings on the N.E.P.A. issues.
A.E.C. regulations provided for hearing procedures for any party other
than the licensee, who objected to a determination of the Commission on the
question of suspension of a construction permit pending full N.E.P.A. review.
These A.E.C. regulations also provided that the Commission could prescribe the
time Hithin which the hea ring procedures should be competed .
The Commission had set forth in its regulations promulgated pursuant to
Calvert Cliffs v three factors to be considered and weighed in the determination
of the question of suspension of a construction permit pending completion'
of a full N.E.P.A. revie,v ;
"2.

In making the determination called for in paragraph 1 , the Commission

will consider and balance the followin g factors :
" (a)

Tfuether it is likely that continued construction or operation during

the prospective review period will give rise to a significant adverse impact
on the environment ; the nature and extent of such

impact ~

if any ; and whether

redress of any such adverse environmental i mpact can reasonably be effected
should modification , suspension or termination of the permit or license result
from the ongoing NEPA environmental review.
l1(b)

~fuether

continued construction or operation during the prospective

review period would foreclose subsequent adoption of alternatives in facility
design or operation of the type that could result from the ongoing NEPA environmental review.

"(C)

The effect of delay in facility construction or operation upon the

public interest.

Of primary importance under this criterion are the power

needs to be served by the

facili~y ;

the availability of alternative sources,

i f any, to meet those needs on a timely basis ; and delay costs to the licensee

and to consumers.

it

Without availing themselves of this hearing procedure because of the delay
involved, the Coalititions for Safe Nuclear Power sought an interlocutory injunction in the Federal Court stayl~g construction until the Court could hear
and adjudicate their claims that AEC had not taken into account appropriate environmental concerns in refusing to suspend the construction permit .
State the question (or questions) presented.
on the petition for an interlocutory injunction?

How should the Court rule

- 3 -

Question 2:
The instant litigation was precipitated by a press release on November 10,
1971, of the Virgin Islands Water and Power Authority announcing an electric
rate increase approximating 20%.

Following this press release very informal

and perfunctory town meeting type public hearings .were..heldon .the.. several
major islands beginning on November 16, 1971.

On

December 3, 1971, Governing

Board of the Authority heard the report on the public hearings and voted to
place the new rate schedule into effect.

These proceeding substantially complied

with the statute of the Virgin Islands Legislature which statute contained no
provision for judiCial review.
In the same day, December 3, 1971, an action for an injunction against
the Authority was brought in the United States District Court of the Virgin
I s lands by the Virgin'.Islands Hotel Association, Inc., a nonprofit corporation whose membership consists of most of the hotels located in the Virgin
Islands.

The Association was not a customer of the Authority.

no business in the Virgin Islands and paid no taxes there.

It conducted

Its office was

in New York.
In its injunction suit the Association sought a decree enjoining the
collection of power charges under the new rates for a period of ten months.
During the ten month period, the Authority would be required, under the
requested injunction decree, to conduct new hearings and make a new rate
study in order to redetermine the propriety of its proposed rates.

If the

current increases were determined to be reasonable, they woUld be continued.
If reductions were required in these rates, the consumers would be reimbursed
or credited with the difference between the current rates and whatever rates
were determined, to be computed from December 1, 1971.

If it was determined

that certain rates would require even a greater increase than was announced ·on
November 10, 1971, then such rates become effective pursuant to the statutory procedure for setting new rates.

The Authovity filed a motion to dismiss

the petitions for the injunction.
lfuat should be the ground, or grounds, of the motion to dismiss?
How should the Court rule on the motion to dismiss, and why?
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Question 3:

These consolidated petitions for review seek to set aside the revised
schedule of fees of the Federal Communications Commission which became effective August 1, 1970.

The petitioners are representatives of the broad-

casting and cable television industries and include several individuals
and corporations which have interests in particular
~fuile

broadcast ~

properties.

the contentions of the several parties vary widely the petitioners

collectively present a broad :challenge to the Commission's authority to
promUlgate and make effective its rule instituting the broad revisions in
its fee schedule, under the rule making procedures followed by FCC.
These fees were imposed by FCC on all its commercial licensees for the
purpose of recovering both the direct and indirect costs of regulating the
broadcast industry.
The concept of user charges was explicitly authorized by Congress in
Title V of the Independent Offices Appropriation Act of 1952.

The Federal

Communications Commission adopted its first fee schedule in 1963 covering all
areas of Commission regulation at the time.
811 (1963).

Report and Order , Fees, 34 F. C.C .

That schedule was challenged before the Seventh Circuit Court

of Appeals , which affirmed the Commission's order, Aeronautical Radio, Inc.
v. United States, 335 F.2d 304 (7th Cir. 1964) , cert . denied, 379 U.S. 966,
85 S.Ct. 658 , 13 L.Ed.2d 559 (1965).

Shortly thereafter the Commission an-

nounced a policy of keeping its fees schedule under continuing review.

See

Fees, 1 F.C . C.2d 1349 (1965).
On February 18 , 1970, the Commission issued a Notice of Proposed Rule
Making looking towards the broad revision of its fee schedule and invited the
filing of written comments.
502, 35 Fed.Reg. 3815 (1970).

Schedule of Fees, Docket No. 18802, 21 F.C.C.Zd
The Commission noted that Congress had urged

that the activities of the Commission become more nearly self-sustaining and
pro?osed a new schedule of fees which would generate estimated fees approximating the Commissionis budgetary request for fiscal year 1971.

These fees

included increases in those areas which were already subject to at least
nominal fees and proposed new fees in areas where the Commission had only
recently exercised jurisdiction to regulate community antenna television
(CATV) and radio frequency equipment testing and approval.
After receiving a large number of written comments from interested
parties , the Commission adopted the revised schedule of Fees on July 1 , 197 0.
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The docu@ent was officially released on July 2.1970, Schedule of Fees , 23 FCC
2d 880 , and was printed in the July 8, 1970 issue of the Federal Register,
35 Fed. Res . 10988 .
The ne,,, schedule was to be effective August:.;1.,1970 on a11 grants made
on or after that date.

The Commission, however, excepted from the grant fees

those applications filed prior to July 1,1970, the date of the adoption of
the new schedule.

The Commission levied an annual fee on CATV systems equal

to $0.30 multiplied by the number of subscribers of the system.
Thereafter a number of petitions for reconsideration were filed with
the Commission concerning various aspects of its fee schedule.
i~6ofar,

These petitions ,

"as they are material to this case, were subsequently denied , 28 FCC2d

139 (1971)

All petitions for review of the Commission's fee schedule rulings ,

filed pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 402(a) in this and other Circuits, here transferred to the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit and consolidated in this
case.
Hhat question, or questions, are presented as to the rule making procedures followed by FCC in adopting this fee schedule rule.

How should the

Court rule on the petitions for revielv i.,ith respect to these rule making
procedures.
Question 4 :
This class action was brought pursuant to the Civil Rights Act of 1871,
42 U.S.C.

~

1983 , on behalf of all recipients of public aid in Illinois who

are members of a family unit of two or more which pays more than $90.00 per
month residence rental but receives $90.00 or less per month as ' a shelter
allowance from the Illinois and the Cook County, Illinois, Departments of
Public Aid.

Defendants are the respective directors of the departments and

are charged by law with the enforcement of the Illinois Public Aid Code.
Section 12-4.11 of the Illinois Public Aid Code, Ill. Rev. Stat. 1967, ch.
23, §12-4.ll, deals with public assistance shelter allowances and provides,
in relevant part:

n[T]he shelter standard for any recipient, exclusive of house-

hold furnishings and utilities shall not exceed $90.00 per month, except for
adjustments made in the manner authorized by § 12-14."

Section 12-14, Ill.

Rev.Stat.1967, ch. 23,§12-l4, provides that the Illinois Deparment" of Public
Aid may, after consultation with the Legislative Advisory Committee on Public
Aid, authorize "deviations" from the $90.00 perllIlonth limitation.
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Plaintiffs filed their original complaint without requesting any exceptions as to them o.f the statutory $90.00 maximum, challenging only the
constitutionality of these statutory provisions on their face.
On November 12, 1968, a three judge court issued its/ opinion finding the
statute constitutional on its face Metcalf v. Swank, 293 F.Supp.268 (N.D. Ill.
1968).

The court found that "the arbitrary nature of a flat maximum" was

avoided in the statute by its provision for exceptions to the $90 . 00 maximum,
and by the statutory provisions for administrative hearing procedures on
requested exceptions to the $90.00 maximum, as well as the statutory provisions for administrative appeals within the Public Aid Department.
court further

const~ued

The

the statute to require the granting of such exceptions

whenever necessary to "provide a livelihood compatible with health and we1lbeing," as stated in section 12-4.11.

Having reached this conclusion, the

three judge court remanded the case to a single Federal Judge for resolution
of any factual questions that might remain.
Plaintiffs did not appeal the decision of the three judge court but
rather filed an amended complaint before the single Federal district judge.
Count I of the amended complaint renewed the challenge to the statute on
its face.

Count I was dismissed because previously decided by the three

judge court.
In Count II of the Amended Complaint the Plaintiffs undertook for the
first time to challenge';: the application of the statutory $90.00 maximum to
them.

The defendants moved the district judge to strike Count II.
What question, or questions, are presented by Count II of the Amended

Complaint and the motion to strike?
on the motion to

. !jtrik~,

How should the district court judge rule

and why?

Question 5:
Armed Services Procurement Regulations (ASPR) provide for suspension.
of contractors, bidders or offerors without hearing, as follows:
ASPR § 1. 605-1

The Secretary or his authorized representative (see § 1.600(b» may, in the
interest of the Government, suspend a firm or individual:
(a) Suspected, upon adequate evidence, of(1) Commission of fraud or a criminal offense as an incident to obtaining ,
attempting to obtain, or in the performance of a public contract ;
(2) Violation of the Federal antitrust statutes arising out of the sumission of bids and proposals; or
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(3)

(b)

ASPR

§

Commission 6f embezzlement, theft, forgery, bribery, falsification or
destruction of records, receiving stolen property, or any other offense
indicating a lack of business integrity or business honesty, which
seriously and directly affects the question of present responsibility
as a Government contractor; or
For other cause of such serious and compelling nature, affecting responsibility as a Government contractor, as may be determined by
the Secretary of the Department concerned to justify suspension.
Suspension of a firm or individual by the Secretary or his authorized
representative shall operate to suspend such firm or individual
through tout the Department of Defense.

1.605

provides in part:

Suspension of a contractor, bidder or offeror is a drastic action
which must be based upon adequate evidence rather than mere accusation.
In assessing adequate evidence, consideration should be given to how
much credible information is available, its reasonableness in vielv
of surrounding circumstances, corroboration or lack thereof as to
important allegations, and inferences which may be drawn from the
existence or absence of affirmative facts. This assessment should
include an examination of basic documents such as contracts, inspection
reports, and correspondence.
ASPR

§

(a)

1.605-2 provides in pertinent part:
Period of Suspension. All suspensions shall be for a temporary period
pending the completion of investigation and such legal proceedings as
may ensue. In the event prosecutive action is not initiated by the Department of Justice within 12 months from the date of the notice of
suspension, the suspension shall be terminated unless an Assistant
Attorney General requests continuance of the suspension. If such a
request is received, the suspension may be continued for an additional
six months. Notice of the proposed removal of the suspension shall
be given to the Department of Justice 30 days prior to the expiration
of the 12 month period. In no event will a suspension continue beyond
18 months unless prosecutive action has been initiated within that
period. tVhen prosecutive action is initiated, the suspension may
continue until the legal proceedings are completed. Upon removal of
a suspension, consideration may be given to debarment~ in accordance
with § 1. 604.

Horne Brothers, Inc., was suspended under these regulations in December,
1971, as a bidder on Department of Defense contracts. Soon thereafter Horne
brought an action alleging that the Secretaries of Defense and Navy had acted
in violation of law by iSSuing the suspension and by refusing to award to
Horne a repair contract on the naval vessel U.S.S. Francis Harion. Horne's
Gomplaint requested, among other things, that the Secretaries of Defense
and Navy be enjoined from thus suspending Horne as a bidder, and that the Secretaries be temporarily restrained from permitting any other bidder to proceed with the repair work on a contract ~1ard. The Secretaries filed a motion
to dismiss the Complaint of Horne.
What question, or questions, are presented by the Complaint and motion
to dismiss? How should the Court rule on the motion to dismiss and on the
requested temporary restraining order, and why?

